A novel protocol -measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) -removes all attacks from the detection system, the most vulnerable part in QKD implementations. In this paper, we present an analysis for practical MDI-QKD. To evaluate its performance, we study various error sources by developing a general system model. We find that MDI-QKD is highly practical and thus can be easily implemented with standard optical devices. Importantly, we present a simple analytical method with only two (general) decoy states for the finite decoy-state analysis. This method can be used directly by experimentalists to demonstrate MDI-QKD. Moreover, by combining the system model with the finite decoy-state method, we present a general framework for the optimal choice of the intensities of the signal and decoy states. Furthermore, we consider a common situation, namely asymmetric MDI-QKD, in which the two quantum channels have different transmittances. We investigate its properties and discuss how to optimize its performance. Our work is of interest not only to experiments demonstrating MDI-QKD but also to other non-QKD experiments involving quantum interference.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] [2] [3] enables an unconditionally secure means of distributing secret keys between two spatially separated parties, Alice and Bob. The security of QKD has been rigorously proven based on the laws of quantum mechanics [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Nevertheless, owing to the imperfections of real-life implementations, a large gap between its theory and practice remains unfilled. In particular, an eavesdropper (Eve) may exploit these imperfections and launch specific quantum attacks. This is commonly called quantum hacking. The first successful quantum hacking against a commercial QKD system was the time-shift attack [9] based on a proposal in [10] . More recently, the phase-remapping attack [11, 12] and the detector-control attack [13, 14] have been implemented against various practical QKD systems. Also, other quantum attacks have appeared in the literature [15] [16] [17] [18] . These results suggest that quantum hacking is a major problem for the real-life security of QKD.
To close the gap between theory and practice, a natural attempt was to characterize the specific loophole and find a countermeasure. For instance, Yuan, Dynes and Shields proposed an efficient countermeasure against the detector-control attack [19, 20] . Once an attack is known, the prevention is usually uncomplicated. However, unanticipated attacks are most dangerous, as it is impossible to fully characterize real devices and account for all loopholes. Hence, researchers moved to the second approach -(full) device-independent QKD [21, 22] . It requires no specification of the internal functionality of QKD devices and offers nearly perfect security. Its legitimate users (Alice and Bob) can be treated as a quasi black box by assuming no memory attacks [23] . Nevertheless, In MDI-QKD [26] , each of Alice and Bob prepares BB84 states in combination with decoy states and sends them to an untrusted relay Charles (or Eve), who is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement. As an example, this figure considers a polarization-encoding scheme. Three unitary operators (U) are used to model the polarization misalignment (or rotation); PBS2 is defined as the fundamental measurement basis; U1 (U2) represents the polarization misalignment of Alice's (Bob's) channel transmission, while U3 models the misalignment of the other measurement setting, PBS1. In the ideal case without any polarization misalignment, the rectilinear (Z) basis, used for key generation in Eq. (1), refers to the basis of PBS1 and PBS2.
device-independent QKD is not really practical because it requires near-unity detection efficiency and generates an extremely low key rate [24, 25] . Therefore, to our knowledge, there has been no experimental paper on deviceindependent QKD.
Fortunately, Lo, Curty and Qi have recently proposed an innovative scheme -measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [26] -that removes all detector sidechannel attacks, the most important security loophole in In real-life MDI-QKD, asymmetry appeared naturally in a recent proof-of-concept experiment [42] .
conventional QKD implementations [9, 10, [13] [14] [15] [16] . As an example of a MDI-QKD scheme (see Fig. 1 ), each of Alice and Bob locally prepares phase-randomized signals (this phase randomization process can be realized using a quantum random number generator such as [27] ) in the BB84 polarization states [1] and sends them to an untrusted quantum relay, Charles (or Eve). Charles is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement (BSM) and broadcast the measurement result. Since the measurement setting is only used to post-select entanglement (in an equivalent virtual protocol [26] ) between Alice and Bob, it can be treated as a true black box. Hence, MDI-QKD is inherently immune to all attacks in the detection system. This is a major achievement as MDI-QKD allows legitimate users to not only perform secure quantum communications with untrusted relays [28] but also out-source the manufacturing of detectors to untrusted manufactures.
Conceptually, the key insight of MDI-QKD is time reversal. This is in the same spirit as one-way quantum computation [29, 30] . More precisely, MDI-QKD built on the idea of a time-reversed EPR protocol for QKD [31, 32] . By combining the decoy-state method [33] [34] [35] [36] with the time-reversed EPR protocol, MDI-QKD gives both good performance and good security.
MDI-QKD is highly practical and can be implemented with standard optical components. The source can be a non-perfect single-photon source (together with the decoy-state method), such as an attenuated laser diode emitting weak coherent pulses (WCPs), and the measurement setting can be a simple BSM realized by linear optics. Hence, MDI-QKD has attracted intensive interest in the QKD community. A number of follow-up theoretical works have already been reported in [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] . Meanwhile, experimental attempts on MDI-QKD have also been made by several groups [42] [43] [44] [45] . Nonetheless, before it can be applied in real life, it is important to solve a number of practical issues. These include:
1. Modelling the errors: an implementation of MDI-QKD may involve various error sources such as the mode mismatch resulting in a non-perfect HongOu-Mandel (HOM) interference [46] . Thus, the first question is: how will these errors affect the performance of MDI-QKD? Or, what is the physical origin of the quantum bit error rate (QBER) in a practical implementation?
2. Finite decoy-state protocol and finite-key analysis: as mentioned before, owing to the lack of true single-photon sources [47] , QKD implementations typically use laser diodes emitting WCPs [3] and single-photon contributions are estimated by the decoy-state protocol [33] [34] [35] [36] . In addition, a real QKD experiment is completed in finite time, which means that the length of the output keys is finite. Thus, the estimation of relevant parameters suffers from statistical fluctuations. This is called the finite-key effect [48, 49] . Hence, the second question is: how can one design a practical finite decoystate protocol and perform a finite-key analysis in MDI-QKD?
3. Choice of intensities: an experimental implementation needs to know the optimal intensities for the signal and decoy states in order to optimize the system performance. Previously, [39] and [41] have independently discussed the finite decoy-state protocol. However, the high computational cost of the numerical approach proposed in [39] , together with the lack of a rigorous discussion of the finite-key effect in both [39] and [41] , makes the optimization of parameters difficult. Thus, the third question is: how can one obtain these optimal intensities?
4. Asymmetric MDI-QKD: as shown in Fig. 2 , in real-life applications, it is quite common that the two channels connecting Alice and Bob to Charles have different transmittances. We call this situation asymmetric MDI-QKD. Importantly, this asymmetric scenario appeared naturally in a recent proof-of-concept experiment [42] , where a tailored length of fiber was intentionally added in the short arm to balance the two channel transmittances.
Since an additional loss is introduced into the system, it is unclear whether this solution is optimal. Hence, the final question is: how can one optimize the performance of this asymmetric case?
The second question has already been discussed in [39] [40] [41] and solved in [50] . In this paper, we offer additional discussions on this point and answer the other questions. Our contributions are summarized below.
1. To better understand the physical origin of the QBER, we propose generic models for various error sources. In particular, we investigate two important error sources -polarization misalignment and mode mismatch. We find that in a polarizationencoding MDI-QKD system [26, 44, 45] , polarization misalignment is the major source contributing to the QBER and mode mismatch (in the time or frequency domain), however, does not appear to be a major problem. These results are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 5 . Moreover, we provide a mathematical model to describe a MDI-QKD system. This model is a useful tool for analyzing experimental results and performing the optimization of parameters. Although this model is proposed to study MDI-QKD, it is also useful for other non-QKD experiments involving quantum interference, such as entanglement swapping [51] and linear optics quantum computing [52] . This result is shown in Appendix B.
2.
A previous method to analyze MDI-QKD with a finite number of decoy states assumes that Alice and Bob can prepare a vacuum state [41] . Here, however, we present an analytical approach with two general decoy states, i.e., without the assumption of vacuum. This is particularly important for the practical implementations, as it is usually difficult to create a vacuum state in decoy-state QKD experiments [53] [54] [55] . The different intensities are usually generated with an intensity modulator, which has a finite extinction ratio (e.g., around 30 dB). Additionally, we also simulate the expected key rates numerically and thus present an optimized method with two decoy states. Ignoring for the moment the finite-key effect, experimentalists can directly use this method to obtain a rough estimation of the system performance. Table II contains the main results for this point.
3. By combining the system model, the finite decoystate protocol, and the finite-key analysis of [50] , we offer a general framework to determine the optimal intensities of the signal and decoy states. Notice that this framework has already been adopted and verified in the experimental demonstration reported in [45] . These results are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 .
4. Finally, we model and evaluate the performance of an asymmetric MDI-QKD system. This allows us to study its properties and determine the experimental configuration that maximizes its secret key rate. These results are shown in Table III and Fig. 8 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the secure key rate and introduce the relevant notations. In Section III, we present mathematical models to study various error sources. In Section IV, we analyze the finite decoy-state method with two general decoy states. We discuss the framework for finding the optimal intensities of signal and decoy states in Section V. In Section VI, we present the results for the asymmetric MDI-QKD. In Section VII, we provide some discussions about the assumptions in MDI-QKD and conclude this paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
The secure key rate of MDI-QKD in the asymptotic case (i.e., assuming an infinite number of decoy states and signals) is given by [26] (1) where Y 1,1 Z and e 1,1 X are, respectively, the yield (i.e., the probability that Charles declares a successful event) in the rectilinear (Z) basis and the error rate in the diagonal (X) basis given that both Alice and Bob send single-photon states (P 1,1 Z denotes this probability in the Z basis); H 2 is the binary entropy function given by H 2 (x)=−x log 2 (x) − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x); Q Z and E Z denote, respectively, the gain and QBER in the Z basis and f e ≥ 1 is the error correction inefficiency function. Here we use the Z basis for key generation and the X basis for testing only [56] . In practice, Q Z and E Z are directly measured in the experiment, while Y 1,1 Z and e
1,1
X can be estimated using the finite decoy-state method [39] [40] [41] 50] .
Next, we introduce some additional notations. We consider one signal state and two weak decoy states for the finite decoy-state protocol. The parameter µ is the intensity (i.e., the mean photon number per optical pulse) of the signal state [57] . ν and ω are the intensities of the two decoy states, which satisfy µ > ν > ω ≥ 0. The sets {µ a ,ν a ,ω a } and {µ b ,ν b ,ω b } contain respectively Alice's and Bob's intensities. The sets {µ } denote the optimal intensities that maximize the key rate. L ac and t a (L bc and t b ) denote the channel distance and transmittance from Alice (Bob) to Charles. In the case of a fiber-based system, t a =10 −αLac/10 with α denoting the channel loss coefficient (α≈0.2 dB/km for a standard telecom fiber). η d is the detector efficiency and Y 0 is the background rate that includes detector dark counts and other background contributions. The parameters e d , e t , and e m denote, respectively, the errors associated with the polarization misalignment, the time-jitter and the total mode mismatch (see definitions below).
III. PRACTICAL ERROR SOURCES
In this section, we consider the original MDI-QKD setting [26] , i.e., the symmetric case with t a =t b . The asymmetric case will be discussed in Section VI. To model the practical error sources, we focus on the fiber-based polarization-encoding MDI-QKD system [26, 44, 45] . Notice, however, that with some modifications, our analysis can also be applied to other implementations such as freespace transmission, the phase-encoding scheme and the time-bin-encoding scheme [42, 43] . See also [38] and [58] respectively for models of phase-encoding and time-binencoding schemes.
A comprehensive list of practical error sources is as follows [59] . Here, we primarily analyze the first two error sources, i.e., polarization misalignment and mode mismatch. The other error sources present minor contributions to the QBER in practice, and are discussed in Appendix A.
A. Polarization misalignment
Polarization misalignment (or rotation) is one of the most significant factors contributing to the QBER in not only the polarization-encoding BB84 system [1] but also the polarization-encoding MDI-QKD system [26, 44, 45] . Since MDI-QKD requires two transmitting channels and one BSM (instead of one channel and a simple measurement as in the BB84 protocol), it is cumbersome to model its polarization misalignment. Here, we solve this problem by proposing a simple model in Fig. 1 . One of the polarization beam splitters (PBS2 in Fig. 1 ) is defined as the fundamental measurement basis [60] . Three unitary operators, {U 1 , U 2 , U 3 }, are considered to model the polarization misalignment of each channel [52] . The operator U 1 (U 2 ) represents the misalignment of Alice's (Bob's) channel transmission, while U 3 models the misalignment of the other measurement setting, PBS1.
For simplicity, we consider a simplified model with a 2-dimensional unitary matrix [61] 
where k=1, 2, 3 and θ k (polarization-rotation angle) is in the range of [−π,π]. For each value of k, we define the polarization misalignment error e k =sin 2 θ k and the total error e d = 3 k=1 e k . Note that e d is equivalent to the systematic QBER in a polarization-encoding BB84 system.
From the model of Fig. 1 , we can analyze the effect of polarization misalignment by evaluating the secure key rate given by Eq. (1). See Appendix B for details. By using the practical parameters listed in Table I , we perform a numerical simulation of the asymptotic key rates for different values of polarization misalignment, e d . The result is shown in Fig. 3 . In this simulation, we temporarily ignore mode mismatch (i.e., set e m =0 in Table I ) and make two practical assumptions for the polarization misalignment: a) each polarization-rotation angle, θ k , follows a Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of θ std k = arcsin( √ e k ); and b) the probability distribution
1.16 2% TABLE I. List of practical parameters for all numerical simulations. These experimental parameters, including the detection efficiency η d , the total misalignment error e d and the background rate Y0, are from the 144km QKD experiment reported in [62] . Since two SPDs are used in [62] , the background rate of each SPD here is roughly half of the value there. We assume that the four SPDs in MDI-QKD (see Fig. 1 ) have identical η d and Y0. The parameter em is the total mode mismatch that is quantified from the experimental values of [45] . Fig. 1 , we incorporate the polarization misalignment into the derivation of the asymptotic key rate given by Eq. (1). We find that MDI-QKD is robust against practical errors due to polarization misalignment. of e k is selected as e 1 =e 2 =0.475e d and e 3 =0.05e d [63] . Fig. 3 shows that a polarization-encoding system can tolerate up to about 6.7% polarization misalignment at 0 km, while at 120 km it can only tolerate up to 5% misalignment. It also shows that MDI-QKD is moderately robust to errors due to polarization misalignment.
B. Mode mismatch
We primarily use the model of mode mismatch in time domain, called time-jitter [64] , to discuss our method. This model is shown in Fig. 4 . We describe Alice's and 
Bob's quantum states in the time domain as
Alice:
where |T a is the orthogonal time mode of |T a , β= √ e t , α= √ 1 − e t , and e t is defined as the time-jitter that represents the probability of Alice's state not overlapping with that of Bob [65] .
This model is a very general method that can be used to study the mode mismatch problem in other domains for a variety of quantum optics experiments involving quantum interference. For instance, a similar discussion can be applied to the spectral (wavelength) mismatch if we write Eq. (3) in the frequency domain. One can also refer to [66] for a general discussion about the spectral mismatch. Considering Eq. (3) in the form of Alice's and Bob's pulse shapes, we can also analyze the pulse-shape mismatch. We define the total mode mismatch in all domains (i.e., time domain and other domains) as e m .
Next, let us discuss how e m affects the key rate given by Eq. (1). As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the overlapping modes between Alice's and Bob's pulses experience a HOM interference at the beam splitter (BS), while the non-overlapping modes transmit through the BS without interference. Assuming that η d ≫ Y 0 and ignoring the polarization misalignment for the moment, we find that the mode mismatch only affects the gains and the error rates in the X basis rather than those in the Z basis [67] . Hence, in Eq. (1), e m mainly affects e 1,1 X . In practice, e 1,1 X can be estimated from the finite decoy-state protocol, i.e., from the gains (Q X ) and QBERs (E X ) in the X basis. Similar to the analysis of the polarization misalignment in Section III A, we can incorporate e m into the derivations of Q X and E X following the method of Appendix B [68] .
Using the parameters of Table I , we simulate the asymptotic key rates for different values of e m . The results are shown in Fig. 5 . In this simulation, we temporarily ignore polarization misalignment (i.e., we set e d =0) and only focus on mode mismatch. At 0 km, we find that the system can tolerate up to 80% mode mismatch and at 120 km, the tolerable value is about 50%. Hence, a polarization-encoding MDI-QKD system is less sensitive to mode mismatch than to polarization misalignment [69] . Notice that we have quantified the value of e m (see Table I ) by using the experimental parameters from [45] and find that e m is usually small in practice (e.g., below 5%). Therefore, mode mismatch does not appear to be a major problem in a MDI-QKD implementation.
IV. FINITE DECOY-STATE PROTOCOL WITH TWO GENERAL DECOY STATES
In a MDI-QKD implementation, by performing the measurements for the different intensities used by Alice and Bob, we can obtain [26] 
where
) denotes the gain (QBER) in the Z (X) basis with the intensity pair {q a , q b }, and Y n,m Z (e n,m X ) denotes the yield (error rate) given that Alice and Bob send respectively an n-photon and m-photon pulse. Here, the key idea of the finite decoy-state protocol is to estimate Y X,U . The general approach for the finite decoy-state protocol has been discussed in [50] . In this section, however, we present a much simpler analytical approach with only two decoy states. The final results are summarized in Table II . They can be directly used by experimentalists (without knowing the details of [50] ) to obtain a rough estimation of the expected system performance. Notice that our notations are different from [50] in that we primarily estimate the probabilities in the case of an infinite number of signals, while [50] focuses on the estimation of counts by incorporating the finite-key effect. Now, let us start to discuss this two decoy-state protocol. As mentioned before, the intensities of the signal and decoy states satisfy µ > ν > ω and our protocol is applicable to either ω = 0 or ω = 0. The key method to estimate Y For the first step, we choose intensity pairs from {µ a , given by
To cancel out Y
Z , we consider two cases.
Z using the same method as in case 1 and derive
Similarly, the strategy to estimate e 
X,L can be estimated using a similar method to that for Y Table II .
V. OPTIMAL CHOICE OF INTENSITIES
In this section, we develop a general framework to choose the optimal intensity values for the signal and decoy states. This framework is shown in Fig. 6 , and is composed of four steps.
1. Quantify the parameters and errors of the system.
For simulation purposes, we will consider the parameters shown in Table I. 2. Model the system using the techniques presented in Section III. A complete model for a polarizationencoding MDI-QKD can be found in Appendix B.
Step1
• Quantify the parameters and errors of the system.
Step2
• Model the system to derive the expected gain and QBER.
Step3
• Implement the finite decoy-state protocol.
Step4
• Apply the finite-key analysis.
FIG. 6. Framework to choose the optimal intensities.
Step 1 is to quantify the parameters and errors of the system (see Table I for some representative values).
Step 2 is to model the system, i.e., derive the gain and QBER by incorporating the practical error sources (see Appendix B for the case of a polarization based system).
Step 3 is to implement the finite decoy-state protocol (see Section IV).
Step 4 is to apply the finite-key analysis [50] to get the optimal intensities as well as other parameters, such as the optimal selection for the probabilities of different intensity settings. . Here we use the method described in Section IV for the finite decoy-state protocol and that of [50] for the finite-key analysis. For this, we consider a total number of signals N =10 14 together with a security bound of ǫ=10 −10 . The non-smooth behaviors in the figure are mainly due to the lack of numerical accuracy.
3. Implement the finite decoy-state protocol. For this, we will consider the analytical method with two decoy states introduced in Section IV. In the simulation, for the weakest decoy state ω, we set its minimum value at 5 × 10 −4 (per pulse) [74] .
4. Apply the finite-key analysis. In our simulation, we employ the rigorous finite-key analysis of [50] and consider a total number of signals N =10 14 [75] together with a security bound of ǫ=10 −10 . Z,L , we only consider one case and refer to Eq. (7) for the other case. Ignoring the finite-key effect, these results can be directly used by experimentalists to obtain a rough estimation of the expected system performance.
Based on this framework, the optimal intensities that maximize the key rate at different transmission distances are shown in Fig. 7 . Notice also that our approach has already been applied to the experimental demonstration reported in [45] , where the polarization misalignment is around 0.7% and the total mode mismatch is below 2%. Owing to the low operation rate there, the value of ω is set to 0.01. The optimal intensities in this scenario are µ 
VI. ASYMMETRIC MDI-QKD
A schematic diagram of the asymmetric MDI-QKD is shown in Fig. 2 . Note that this asymmetric scenario appeared naturally in a recent field-test experiment performed in Calgary [42] . Another concrete illustration can be found at the Tokyo QKD network [76] , in which the asymmetric case occurs if Koganei-1 (Alice) and Koganei-3 (Bob) use Koganei-2 (Charles) as the quantum relay to perform MDI-QKD, where the two fiber links are respectively 90 km and 1 km. Here we define a parameter x to quantify the ratio of the two channel transmittances, i.e., x = t a /t b . In the Calgary's system, x=0.752, while in the Tokyo QKD network x=0.017.
A. Problem identification
The main question here is how to choose the optimal intensities in this asymmetric situation. In the asymptotic case, these optimal intensities refer to the two signal states µ with both in O(1). If we ignore the system imperfections such as background counts and other practical errors, the error rates (e 1,1
X and E Z in Eq. 1) will be zero, while P =1 (see Appendix B 1 for the details). However, in practice, it is inevitable to have some practical errors such as the polarization misalignment discussed above. A relatively large intensity in the short channel will significantly increase the QBER due to the misalignment. Moreover, owing to the intensity mismatch on Charles's side (µ opt a t a =µ opt b t b ), the quantum interference known as the HOM dip, will be imperfect.
As a consequence, this option leads to a relatively large QBER, which decreases the key rate due to the cost of error correction.
To minimize the QBER, a second option is to choose µ opt a t a =µ opt b t b regardless of x. We denote this situation as the symmetric choice (indicated by Symmetry in Fig. 8 and Table III ). An equivalent implementation scheme for this option is to add a tailored length of fiber in the local station of the sender with the short channel transmission (i.e., Bob in Fig. 2 ) in order to balance the two channel transmittances. In fact, such a scheme was recently implemented in a proof-of-principle MDI-QKD experiment [42] . However, when x is far from 1, to satisfy µ a t a =µ b t b , either µ a or µ b needs to be relatively small. Hence, we cannot derive good bounds for P X results in the decrease of the key rate due to the cost of privacy amplification.
In summary, we find that both of the above two options are sub-optimal. We present the optimal choice below.
B. Summary of results

Asymptotic case
Two decoy-state case Parameters Symmetry Optimum Symmetry Optimum We assume a fixed channel mismatch, x=0.1 (Lac-L bc =50km). In the symmetric choice (Symmetry in figure) , we set µata=µ b t b , while in the optimal choice (Optimum in figure) , we non-trivially determine the optimal intensities by numerical simulation. The red curves are evaluated by the two decoy-state protocol (Section IV) combined with the finite-key analysis of [50] . Note that in each curve, all the intensities of the signal and decoy states are optimized by maximizing the key rate. On average, the key rate with the optimal choice is around 80% larger than that with the symmetric choice in both asymptotic and two decoy-state cases.
The optimal choice (indicated by Optimum in Fig. 8 and Table III) Table III for further details. 2. In an asymmetric system with x=0.1 (50 km length difference for two standard fiber links), the advantage of the optimal choice is shown in Fig. 8 , where the key rate with the optimal choice is around 80% larger than that with the symmetric choice in both asymptotic and practical cases [77] . We remark that when x is far from 1, this advantage is more significant. For instance, with x=0.01 (100 km length difference), the key rate with the optimal choice is about 150% larger than that with the symmetric choice.
3. In the asymptotic case, at a short distance where background counts can be ignored: µ are only determined by x instead of t a or t b (see the optimal intensities in Table III and Theorem 1 can be analytically derived and the optimal key rate is quadratically proportional to t b (see Appendix C).
Finally, notice that the channel transmittance ratio in Calgary's asymmetric system is near 1 (x=0.752), hence the optimal choice can slightly improve the key rate compared to the symmetric choice (around 2% improvement). However, in Tokyo's asymmetric system (x=0.017), the optimal choice can significantly improve the key rate by over 130%.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A key assumption in MDI-QKD [26] is that Alice and Bob trust their devices for the state preparation, i.e., they can generate ideal quantum states in the BB84 protocol. One approach to remove this assumption is to quantify the imperfections in the state preparation part and thus include them into the security proofs [37] . We believe that this assumption is practical because Alice's and Bob's quantum states are prepared by themselves and thus can be experimentally verified in a fully protected laboratory environment outside of Eve's interference. For instance, based on an earlier proposal [78] , C. C. W. Lim et al. have introduced another interesting scheme [79] in which each of Alice and Bob uses an entangled photon source (instead of WCPs) and quantifies the state-preparation imperfections via random sampling. That is, Alice and Bob randomly sample parts of their prepared states and perform a local Bell test on these samples. Such a scheme is very promising, as it is in principle a fully device-independent approach. It can be applied in short-distance communications.
In conclusion, we have presented an analysis for practical MDI-QKD systems. To understand the physical origin of the QBER, we have investigated various practical error sources by developing a general system model. We have also discussed a simple analytical method for the finite decoy-state analysis, which can be directly used by experimentalists to demonstrate MDI-QKD. In addition, by combining the system model with the finite decoy-state method, we have presented a general framework for the optimal intensities of the signal and decoy states. Furthermore, we have studied the properties of the asymmetric MDI-QKD protocol and discussed how to optimize its performance. Our work is relevant to both QKD and general experiments on quantum interference.
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Intensity fluctuations at the source
The intensity fluctuations of the signal and decoy states at the source are relatively small (∼ 0.1 dB) [55] . Additionally, Alice and Bob can in principle locally and precisely quantify their own intensities. Therefore, this error source can be mostly ignored in the theoretical model that analyzes the performance of practical MDI-QKD (but one could easily include it in the analysis).
Threshold detector with background counts
The threshold single photon detector (SPD) can be modeled by a beam splitter with η d transmission and (1-η d ) reflection. The transmission part is followed by a unity efficiency detector, while the reflection part is discarded. η d is defined as the detector efficiency. Background counts can be treated to be independent of the incoming signals. For simplicity, the system model discussed in Section B assumes that the four SPDs (see Fig. 1 ) are identical and have a detection efficiency η d and a background rate Y 0 . Note, however, that if this condition is not satisfied (i.e., there is some detection efficiency mismatch) our system model can be adapted to take care also of this case. [45] , the beam splitter ratio is 0.5007, which introduces negligible QBER (below 0.01%) in a typical MDI-QKD system.
All the simulations reported in the main text already consider a background rate of Y 0 =6.02 × 10 −6 (see Table I). Fig. 9 simulates more general cases of the asymptotic key rates at different background count rates. At 0 km, the MDI-QKD system can tolerate up to 10 −3 (per pulse) background counts.
Beam splitter ratio
In practice, for telecom wavelengths, the asymmetry of the beam splitter (BS) (i.e., not 50:50) is usually small. For instance, the wavelength dependence of the fiber-based BS in our lab (Newport-13101550-5050 fiber coupler) is experimentally quantified in Fig. 10 . If the laser wavelength is 1542 nm [45] , the BS ratio is 0.5007, which introduces negligible QBER (below 0.01%) in a MDI-QKD system. Hence, this error source can also be ignored in the theoretical model of MDI-QKD.
Appendix B: System model -analytical key rate
In this section, we discuss an analytical method to model a polarization-encoding MDI-QKD system. That is, we calculate Y 1,1
X , Q Z and E Z and thus estimate the expected key rate from Eq. (1).
To simplify our calculation, we make two assumptions about the practical error sources: a) since most practical error sources do not contribute significantly to the system performance, we only consider the polarization misalignment e d , the background count rate Y 0 and the detector efficiency η d ; b) for the model of the polarization misalignment, we consider only two unitary operators, U 1 and U 2 , to represent respectively the polarization misalignment of Alice's and Bob's channel transmission, i.e., set U 3 =I in the generic model of Sec. III A. For simplicity, a more rigorous derivation with U 3 = I is not shown here, but it can be easily completed following our procedures discussed below. 
Y
Z . Importantly, we can see that ignoring the imperfections of polarization misalignment and background counts (i.e., e d = 0, Y 0 = 0), e 1,1 X is zero, while P
) can be maximized with µ a =µ b . Thus, the optimal choice of intensities is µ a =µ b =1. However, in practice, it is inevitable to have certain practical errors, which result in this optimal choice being a function of the values of practical errors.
QZ and EZ
Now, let us calculate Q Z and E Z , which are eventually given by Eq. (B10). To further simplify our discussion, we use {horizonal,vertical,45-degree,135-degree} to represent the BB84 polarization states.
Also, {HH, HV, ++, +−} will denote Alice's and Bob's encoding modes. We define the following notations:
a. Derivation of Q HH Z First, both Alice and Bob encode their states in the H mode (symmetric to V mode). We assume that U 1 and U 2 (see Eq. (2)) rotate the polarization in the same direction, i.e. θ 1 θ 2 > 0. The discussion regarding rotation in the opposite direction (i.e. θ 1 θ 2 < 0) is in Appendix B 2 d.
In Charles's lab, after the BS and PBS (see Fig. 1 ), the optical intensities received by each SPD are given by
where φ denotes the relative phase between Alice's and Bob's weak coherent states. Thus, the detection probability of each threshold SPD is
where V = A, B, C, D. Then, the coincident counts are
where Q 
I 0 (e d1 β)
I 0 (e d1 β) 
Here, to simplify Eq. (B4), we ignore background counts, i.e., Y 0 = 0, and use a 2nd order approximation (as both β and γ are typically on the order of 0.01) such that
then, Eq. (B4) can be estimated as
and Q
HH Z
is given by
b. Derivation of Q
HV Z
Alice (Bob) encodes her (his) state in the H (V) mode (symmetric to V (H)). We also assume θ 1 θ 2 > 0. At Charles's side, the optical intensities received by each SPD are given by
The detection probability of each SPD is described by Eq. (B3). Q 
To simplify Eq. (B7) we once again ignore the background counts and take a 2nd order approximation. Eq. (B7) can be estimated as
c. Derivation of QZ and EZ Finally, Q Z and E Z can be expressed as
where the different terms on the r.h.s. of this equation are given by Eqs. (B4, B5, B7, B8). Therefore, together with Eq. (B1), we could derive the analytical key rate of Eq. (1). If we ignore background counts and take the 2nd order approximation from Eqs. (B6, B9), Q Z and E Z can be written as
2 ,
d. QZ and EZ with opposite rotation angle
When U 1 and U 2 rotate the polarization in the opposite direction, i.e., θ 1 θ 2 < 0, Eq. (B2) changes to
After performing similar procedures to those of Section B 2 a, Eq. (B6) is altered to
Since the QBER is mainly determined by Q 
Therefore, the key rates of R ψ − (projections on the Triplet) and R ψ + (projections on the Singlet) are correlated with the relative direction of the rotation angles, while the overall key rate R (R = R ψ − + R ψ + ) is independent of the relative direction of the rotation angles.
We finally remark that in a practical polarizationencoding MDI-QKD system, the polarization rotation angle of each quantum channel (θ 1 or θ 2 ) can be modeled by a Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of θ std k = arcsin( √ e k ) (k = 1, 2), which means that both θ 1 and θ 2 (mostly) distribute in the range of [−3θ std k , 3θ
std k ] and the relative direction between them also randomly distributes between θ 1 θ 2 > 0 and θ 1 θ 2 < 0. Hence, the effect of the polarization misalignment is the same for R ψ − and R ψ + , i.e., both R ψ − and R ψ + are independent of the total polarization misalignment. We can experimentally choose to measure either the Singlet or the Triplet by using only two detectors (but sacrificing half of the total key rate), such as in the experiments of [42, 45] .
The estimated key rate R est is defined under the condition that background counts can be ignored. Note that this is a reasonable assumption for a short distance transmission. 
,
If we take the 2nd order approximation, Q Z and E Z are estimated as (see Eq. (B11))
By combining the above two equations with Eq. (1), the overall key rate can be written as where E Z is given by Eq. (C1) and is also a function of (x, µ a , µ b ). Therefore, optimizing R est is equivalent to maximizing G(x, µ a , µ b ) and the optimal values, µ opt a and µ opt b , are only determined by x. Under a fixed x, the optimal key rate is quadratically proportional to t b .
For a given x, the maximization of G(x, µ a , µ b ) can be done by calculating the derivatives over µ a and µ b and verified using the Jacobian matrix.
Properties of asymmetric MDI-QKD
We numerically study the properties of an asymmetric MDI-QKD system. In our simulations below, the asymptotic key rate, denoted by R rig , is rigorously calculated from the key rate formula given by Eq. (1) in which each term is shown in Appendix B. R est denotes the estimated key rate from Eq. (C2). The practical parameters are listed in Table I . We used the method of [50] for the finite-key analysis.
Firstly, Fig. 11 simulates the key rates of R rig and R est at different channel lengths. For short distances (i.e., total lengthL ac + L bc <100 km), the overlap between R est and R rig demonstrates the accuracy of our estimation model of Eq. (C2). Therefore, in the short distance range, we could focus on R est to understand the behaviors of the depend only on x, while at long distances (i.e., x<0.5), background counts contribute significantly. The non-smooth behaviors here are mainly due to background counts and numerical errors. key rate. Moreover, from the curve of L bc =1m, we have that this asymmetric system can tolerate up to x=0.004 (120 km length difference for standard fiber links).
Secondly, Fig. 12 shows µ Finally, we simulate the optimal key rates under two fixed x in Fig. 13. 1. Solid curves are the asymptotic keys: at short distances (L bc +L ac <120 km), the maximal G(x, µ a , µ b ) is fixed with a fixed x (see Eq. (C3)). Taking the logarithm with base 10 of R est and writing t b =10 −αL bc , Eq. (C2) can be expressed as log 10 R est = −2αL bc + log 10 η
Hence, the scaling behavior between the logarithm (base 10) of the key rate and the channel distance is linear, which can be seen in the figure. Here, α = 0.2 dB/km (standard fiber link) results in a slope of -0.4.
2. Dotted curves are the two decoy-state key rates with the finite-key analysis: we consider a total number of signals N = 10 14 and a security bound of ǫ = 10 −10 ; for the dotted curve with x=0.1, the optimal intensities satisfy µ a /µ b ≈ ν a /ν b ≈ 7, which means that the ratios for the optimal µ and ν are roughly the same and this ratio is mainly determined by x. Even taking the finite-key effect into account, the system can still tolerate a total fiber link of 110 km.
